【主讲】清华大学经管学院助理教授杨柳【题目】为什么队列经常太长或太短？

【时间】2013-12-19（周四）,10-12:00

【地点】清华经管学院伟伦楼453

【语言】英语

【主办】管理科学与工程系

【摘要】We consider a queueing system where customers are loss averse relative to a reference point determined by their recent expectations about the service. Customers are reference dependent in both service price and waiting time. We first study customers’ queue joining strategies. We found that in the equilibrium, the queue length is polarized compare to the case without reference effect. In particular, when the traditional predicted queue-length is long, the actual queue length with reference effect is longer, and vice versa. We call this the “self-fulfilling queue length”. We then study a server’s pricing decision in both monopoly and duopoly markets. We found that profit-maximizing price and welfare-maximizing price are not the same in a monopoly market. For the duopoly market, we demonstrate that the equilibrium prices can be higher with loss-averse customers. Also, loss aversion results in delay-stickiness effect in a duopoly competition.