【主讲】复旦大学助理教授窦一凡

【题目】多边平台的动态竞争和补贴策略

【时间】2015年11月27日（周五）下午2:30-4:00

【地点】清华经管学院伟伦楼385

【语言】中英文

【主办】管理科学与工程系

【简历】窦一凡，现任复旦大学管理学院信息管理与信息系统系助理教授。窦一凡毕业于清华大学经管学院管理科学工程系，先后获管理学学士学位和管理学博士学位。他的主要研究兴趣是电子商务、信息系统经济学和信息产品营销策略。窦一凡博士的研究工作先后发表在《Information System Research》《European Journal of Operational Research》等国际一流学术期刊上，并被ICIS /HICSS/PACIS/WISE等信息管理领域顶尖国际会议的论文集收录。此外，窦一凡担任了多个国际顶尖学术期刊的审稿人，并获得2015《Management Science》的优秀服务奖。

Yifan Dou, Assistant Professor, Fudan University：Dynamic Platform Competition: Optimal Subsidizing Strategies

【Speaker】Yifan Dou, Assistant Professor, Fudan University

【Title】Dynamic Platform Competition: Optimal Subsidizing Strategies

【Time】Friday, Nov. 27, 2:30-4:00pm

【Venue】Room 385, Weilun Building, Tsinghua SEM

【Language】Chinese, English

【Organizer】Department of Management Science and Engineering

【Abstract】Platforms frequently employ subsidizing strategies to attract users (e.g., consumers) on one side in order to profit more from the other side (e.g., content providers) via cross-side network effects. Despite its importance in business practice, the academic literature is rare on optimal subsidizing strategies under dynamic platform competition. This paper aims to address this research question using a stylized game-theoretic model. First, we extend the single-period duopoly platform competition model in the literature to a two-period setting. We identify conditions when optimal subsidizing strategies in the single-period model carry through in the two-period setting, and more importantly, when not. In particular, we show that under symmetric duopoly, when the second period discount factor exceeds a certain threshold, subsidizing the consumer side in period 1 becomes optimal. This is new and contrasts sharply to the single-period model finding in the literature where subsidizing consumers is not optimal. Second, we investigate a new setting of asymmetric duopoly where one platform (called the incumbent) is endowed with an initial installed base on the consumer side. For example, the incumbent may employ the ``platform envelopment'' strategy by redirecting her existing customers into the new market in order to compete with her rival platform (called the startup). We investigate the impact of such an initial installed base on each platform's optimal subsidizing strategies. We are particularly interested in the startup's strategies when competing against such an incumbent. We identify regions when the startup should subsidize more, and more importantly, when less. For example and somewhat counter intuitively, so long as the network effects are not too strong, the startup does not need to extensively subsidize the consumer side in responding to a larger initial installed base of the incumbent.