【主讲】重庆大学副教授徐鸿雁

【题目】异质销售团队的薪酬和价格授权

【时间】2015年11月18日（周三）下午4:00-6:00

【地点】清华经管学院伟伦楼453

【语言】中英文

【主办】管理科学与工程系

【简历】徐鸿雁老师的简历

清华大学经济管理学院博士，哈尔滨工业大学管理学院学士，现为重庆大学经济与工商管理学院副教授、博士生导师，入选重庆市青年拔尖人才。主持国家自然科学基金两项，在《Decision Sciences》《Omega》《Operations Research Letters》《Electronic Commerce Research and Applications》《Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering》等权威或重要国际学术期刊以及《管理科学学报》、《中国管理科学》、《系统工程理论与实践》、《系统工程学报》等权威或重要中文学术期刊上发表（或录用）学术论文二十余篇。

Hongyan Xu, Associate Professor, Chongqing University：Compensation and Price Delegation for Heterogeneous Sales Force

【Time】Wednesday, Nov. 18, 4-6pm

【Speaker】Hongyan Xu, Associate Professor, Chongqing University

【Title】Compensation and Price Delegation for Heterogeneous Sales Force

【Time】Wednesday, Nov. 18, 4-6pm

【Venue】Room 453, Weilun Building, Tsinghua SEM

【Language 】Chinese, English

【Organizer】Department of Management Science and Engineering

【Abstract】Heterogeneous sales forces may not be considered as desirable as homogeneous sales forces because of two reasons: information premiums are required for all except one type of agents, and only agents of the highest type will work as hard as though they are members of a homogeneous sales force. This study revisits the heterogeneous sales force compensation and price delegation problem with type-dependent reservation. We find that an equilibrium separating or pooling contracts always exists under centralized pricing, while it may not exist under delegation. Different types of agents may receive premiums, and they are scenarios wherein no premiums are paid. Centralized pricing provides a tool for the firm to regulate agent behavior, whereas delegated pricing may outperform centralized pricing. We also find that more than one or even all agent types may work as hard as though they are members of a homogeneous sales force and, in some case, some agents may even work harder. These findings differ fundamentally from the existing results and are driven by the dynamics between the differences in reservations and agents' effort costs arising from concealing their true agent types.