【主题】并购交易中可转换证券与双向信息不对称问题之对策研究

【主讲人】Yan An 美国福特汉姆大学副教授，金融领域

【时间】 2：30pm四月二十四日

【地点】 舜德102

【语言】 中文/英文

【主办】 金融系

【目标听众】博士生，硕士生以及经管学院教师

【简介】* 主讲内容、演讲者、或其他相关背景资料

This paper provides a rationale for the use of convertible securities as the medium of exchange in corporate change-of-control transactions. We argue that convertible securities can resolve the information asymmetry about the bidder’s value while at the same time mitigating the information asymmetry about the target’s value. Prior research has analyzed the choice between cash and stock, which can resolve one information asymmetry or the other but not both. We furnish empirical support for the use of convertible securities to resolve the double-sided asymmetric information problem. We find that a bidder is more likely to offer convertible securities, rather than all cash or all stock, when both the bidder and its target face large asymmetric information problems. We also find that convertibles are more likely to be offered in a takeover to deal with the asymmetric information problem on one side of the transaction (either the bidder side or the target side) only when the other side of the transaction also has a large information asymmetry. Finally, as expected from our double-sided asymmetric information rationale, we find that bidders in convertible deals enjoy larger abnormal stock returns around takeover announcements than bidders in all-cash and all-stock deals, but that targets in convertible deals experience smaller abnormal stock returns than targets in all-cash and all-stock deals.

详情请点击附件：| ConvertibleInMerger.pdf| CURRICULUM VITAE_AnYan.pdf