【Speaker】LIU Yan, Doctoral Student from Krannert School of Management, Purdue University

【Topic】On the Timing and Depth of a Manufacturer’s Sales Promotion, Decisions with Forward-looking Consumers

【Time】2009-12-3 13:30-15:00

【Venue】Room101, Shunde Building

【Language】English

【Organizer】Department of Marketing

Abstract

This paper investigates a manufacturer’s optimal timing and depth of price promotions over a planning horizon in a frequently purchased packaged goods context. Promotion policy is the equilibrium outcomes of a dynamic game between consumers and the manufacturer. Consumers form expectation over future promotions and strategically time their purchase to coincide withthe manufacturer’s promotion events. The forward-looking manufacturer takes this consumer behavior into account and dynamically evaluates promotional response of consumers in each choice segment based on their inventory levels when making optimal promotion decisions