【Topic】Crises and Productivity in Good Booms and in Bad Booms

【Speaker】Gary Gorton，Professor, Yale University

【Time】 13:45-15:15, March 20, Thursday

【Venue】Room 401, Weilun Building, Tsinghua SEM.

【Language】English

【Organizer】Department of Finance

【Target Audience】Faculty Members and Graduate Students

【Background Information】

GARY B. GORTON IS THE FREDERICK FRANK CLASS OF 1954Professor of Finance at the Yale School of Management, which he joined in August 2008. Prior to joining Yale, he was the Robert Morris Professor of Banking and Finance at The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, where he taught from 1983 to 2008. Dr. Gorton has done research in many areas of finance and economics, including both theoretical and empirical work. He is the author of Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007 (Oxford University Press) andMisunderstanding Financial Crises (Oxford University Press).

Dr. Gorton has consulted for the U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, various U.S. Federal Reserve Banks, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, and the Central Bank of Turkey. He was a consultant to AIG Financial Products from 1996 to 2008.

Dr. Gorton received his doctorate in economics from the University of Rochester. In the field of economics, he received master's degrees at the University of Rochester and Cleveland State University, and also received a master's degree in Chinese Studies from the University of Michigan.

Abstract;

Credit booms usually precede financial crises. However, some credit booms end in a crisis (bad booms) and other booms do not (good booms). We document that, while all booms start with an increase in the growth of Total Factor Productivity (TFP), such growth falls much faster subsequently for bad booms. We then develop a simple framework to explain this. Firms finance investment opportunities with short-term collateralized debt. If agents do not produce information about the collateral quality, a credit boom develops, accommodating firms with lower quality projects and increasing the incentives of lenders to acquire information about the collateral, eventually triggering a crisis. When the quality of investment opportunities also grow, the credit boom may not end in a crisis because there is a gradual adoption of low quality projects, but those projects are also of better quality, not inducing information about collateral.