【主讲】 Jee-Hyeong Park，首尔国立大学经济学教授

【主题】 完善的私人监测预审协议

【时间】 2011-10-27（周四）14:30-16:00

【地点】 清华经管学院 伟伦楼409

【语言】 英文

【主办】 清华大学经济管理学院经济系

【Speaker】 Jee-Hyeong Park, Professor, School of Economics, Seoul National University

【Topic】 Pre-trial Settlement with Imperfect Private Monitoring

【Time】 14:30-16:00, 2011-10-27, Thursday

【Venue】 Weilun 409, Tsinghua SEM

【Language】 English

【Organizer】 Department of Economics

Abstract

We model pretrial settlement bargaining in the World Trade Organization as a signaling game with nontransferable utility in which the defending country knows the likelihood of winning in the court and the complaining country receives only an imperfect signal about the likelihood of the court outcome. We study the consequences of improving the accuracy of the complaining party's private signal on the likelihood and terms of settlement. Among other results, we find that when private signal is not accurate enough, an increase in the quality of private signal increases the likelihood of a dispute.